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Murdering Crows: Pauli Murray,
Intersectionality, and Black Freedom
Lisa A. Crooms-Robinson*
Abstract
What is intersectionality’s origin story and how did it make
its way into human rights? Beginning in the 1940s, Pauli
Murray (1910–1985) used Jane Crow to capture two distinct
relationships between race and sex discrimination. One Jane
used the race-sex analogy to show that race and sex were both
unconstitutionally arbitrary. The other Jane captured Black
women’s experiences and rights deprivations at the intersection
of race and sex. Both Janes were based on Murray’s fundamental
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University), Sonja N. Woods (Archivist, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center,
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Pauli Murray and showed me the importance of telling our own stories.
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belief that the struggles against race and sex discrimination were
different phases of the fight for human rights.
In 1966, Murray was part of the American Civil Liberties
Union team that litigated White v. Crook. In White, a
three-judge federal district court panel declared Lowndes
County, Alabama’s jury selection process discriminated against
the county’s Black residents based on both race and sex in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. What appeared to be an
intersectional victory for Black women, was, in fact, an
analogical victory for white women. The reasoning and the
remedy erased the Black women litigants and the Lowndes
County Black Freedom Movement, both of which were essential
to the litigation.
By situating White in the context of the Lowndes County
movement, this Article demonstrates the centrality of Black
feminist praxis to the county’s Black Freedom politics. The
women in the movement took aim at Jane Crow which
personified their intersectional experiences. Freedom for the
county’s Black female majority did not require white women’s
subjugation. By contrast, white women’s equality was a claim to
share power with white men which included the power to
maintain Jim and Jane Crow. Therefore, intersectional Jane
and analogical Jane were on opposite sides of the fight for Black
freedom in Lowndes County where white Jane’s equality
required Black Jane to remain unfree.
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“What shall I do about killing Jane Crow?”1
“eenie meenie minie moe
catch a voter by her toe
if she hollers then you know
got yourself a real jane crow”2
“Until the killing of black mothers’ sons is as important as
the killing of white mothers’ sons, we who believe in freedom
cannot rest.”3

INTRODUCTION
Pauli Murray spent a lifetime pushing boundaries and
engaging intersections. Whether it was “the dual burden” of race
and sex discrimination faced by Black women;4 the triple
burdens or “multiple disadvantages” of either “race, sex, and
economic exploitation,”5 race, sex, and age;6 or the “quadruple
burdens of being Black, female, poor, and sexually
non-conformist,”7 her life and work demonstrated that neither

1. Letter from Pauli Murray to Leon Ransom (May 1954), in PAULI
MURRAY ARCHIVES, BOX 84; F. 1467 (Schlesinger Library, Harvard Radcliffe
Institute).
2. Rebecca Foust, Evie Shockley: “Women’s Voting Rights at One
Hundred (But Who’s Counting?),” WOMEN’S VOICES FOR CHANGE (Oct. 25,
2020), https://perma.cc/34U2-YY95.
3. BARBARA RANSBY, ELLA BAKER AND THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT: A
RADICAL DEMOCRATIC VISION 335 (2003).
4. E.g., Pauli Murray, The Negro Woman in the Quest for Equality, in
REBELS IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS 172 (J. Clay
Smith ed. 2000) [hereinafter Murray, Quest for Equality]; PAULI MURRAY, SONG
IN A WEARY THROAT: MEMOIR OF AN AMERICAN PILGRIMAGE 388 (1987)
[hereinafter MURRAY, SONG]; Pauli Murray, The Liberation of Black Women,
in WORDS OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT
186 (Beverly Guy-Sheftall ed. 1995) [hereinafter Murray, Liberation].
5. MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 744.
6. Id. at 311–12.
7. Florence Wagman Roisman, Lessons for Advocacy from the Life and
Legacy of the Reverend Doctor Pauli Murray, 20 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER, & CLASS 1, 2 (2020); see BRITTNEY C. COOPER, BEYOND
RESPECTABILITY: THE INTELLECTUAL THOUGHT OF RACE WOMEN 87 (2017)
(identifying Murray’s “struggles with queer and nonnormative sex and gender
identities”).
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identity nor discrimination was one-dimensional.8 Although
Murray was committed to ending all forms of oppression, she
paid particular attention to race and sex discrimination as
“different phases of the fundamental and indivisible issue of
human rights.”9 Murray’s work at the intersection of race and
sex was personified by Jane Crow almost forty years before Jane
would be understood as “intersectional.”10
8. See COOPER, supra note 7, at 87–88 (describing some of Murray’s
challenges in the legal and academic fields due to her race, gender
identification, or both). This Article adopts the she/her/hers pronouns Murray
used in written work.
9. Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex
Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 235 (1965). For
Murray, the universality of human rights meant they were rights to be enjoyed
by all “without regard to national origin, race, color, language, religion, sex,
political or other opinion, parentage, or economic status.” PAULI MURRAY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, U.S.A.: 1948–1966 1 (1967) [hereinafter, MURRAY, HUMAN
RIGHTS]; see also MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 341–42; Pauli Murray,
Memorandum in Support of Retaining the Amendment to H.R. 7152, Title VII
(Equal Opportunity) to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment Because of Sex
4–13 (Apr. 14, 1964) (on file with Schlesinger Libr., Radcliffe Inst. for
Advanced Stud., Harv. Univ.) [hereinafter Murray, Title VII Memorandum]
(noting the parallel between race and sex discrimination and that both are
human rights violations). Murray’s human rights praxis translates this
universality into a need “to see the whole” through which “[w]e discover that
we do not have one identity but several overlapping identities.” Pauli Murray,
Black Strategies Responding to Thomas Sowell. I Know Where You’re Coming
from, But . . ., in REBELS IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS
163 (J. Clay Smith ed. 2000) [hereinafter Murray, Black Strategies]; see also
Murray, Liberation, supra note 4, at 197 (“The lesson of history [is] that all
human rights are indivisible and that the failure to adhere to this principle
jeopardizes the rights of all.”). Murray wrote about human rights as early as
1950 when, in the introduction to States’ Laws on Race and Color, Murray
noted that “[b]ecause of the widespread interest in the broad field of human
rights, many state legislatures were exceedingly active in this area during
1949.” PAULI MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 6 (2016) [hereinafter
MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS]; see also, Lisa A. Crooms, “To Establish My Legitimate
Name Inside the Consciousness of Strangers”: Critical Race Praxis, Progressive
Women-of-Color Theorizing, and Human Rights, 46 HOW. L.J. 229, 238 n.32
(2003).
10. See Murray & Eastwood, supra note 9, at 242 (discussing Title VII’s
protections for Black women workers); MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9,
at 1, 7; MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 334 (“Howard Law School . . . was also
the place where I first became conscious of the twin evil of discriminatory sex
bias, which I quickly labeled Jane Crow.”); see also Elizabeth Alexander,
Introduction to PAULI MURRAY, DARK TESTAMENT AND OTHER POEMS xi–xii
(1970) (“Murray was an intersectional analyst on race, gender, and class before
those who would develop the theory and the phrase were born.”); COOPER,
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Born sometime between 1941 and 1944 while Murray was
a student at the Howard University School of Law, Jane Crow
captured Murray’s awareness of Jim Crow’s “twin evil of
discriminatory sex bias.”11 As the only woman in her graduating
class, Murray found “the racial factor was removed in the
intimate environment of a Negro law school dominated by men,
and the factor of gender was fully exposed.”12 If Howard was
where Jane was named, then Harvard Law School was Murray’s
opponent in her “first battle against ‘Jane Crow.’”13 “[C]aught
between the tradition of Howard and the tradition of Harvard
not to admit women,” Murray “decided . . . to put up a clean fight
to get into Harvard.”14 Although the fight was clean, Murray did
not prevail.15 Consequently, in the fall of 1944, Murray enrolled
at the University of California at Berkeley, where she earned
her L.L.M. degree.16
supra note 7, at 91 (“Jane Crow is . . . one of the earliest articulations of
intersectional theory within Black feminist thought.”); PATRICIA HILL COLLINS,
INTERSECTIONALITY AS CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY 221 (2019) (“Murray’s
intellectual activism . . . prefigures the core ideas of intersectionality’s
content . . . .”); Roisman, supra note 7, at 23 (“Murray’s life and work
emphasized the centrality of intersectionality.”); Kimberlé Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989) (introducing the term “intersectionality” in legal
scholarship); Lisa A. Crooms, Indivisible Rights and Intersectional Identities
or, “What Do Women’s Human Rights Have To Do with the Race Convention?”,
40 HOW. L.J. 619, 623 (1997) (discussing intersectionality in human rights law
and discourse).
11. MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 334.
12. Id. at 335.
13. Id. at 442; see also id. at 431
I had entered law school preoccupied with the racial struggle . . . but I
graduated an unabashed feminist as well. Ironically, my effort to become a
more proficient advocate in the first struggle led directly into the second
through an unanticipated chain of events which began in the late fall of my
senior year.

14. See Pauli Murray, Pauli Murray’s Appeal: For Admission to Harvard
Law School, in REBELS IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS
79, 81 (J. Clay Smith ed. 2000) [hereinafter Murray, Appeal to Harvard Law]
(noting that Murray was denied admission to Harvard Law School because she
was “a functionally normal woman” even though her rank as first in her
graduating class would have otherwise garnered her admission to Harvard);
see also MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 238–44.
15. MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 441–42.
16. Id. at 447.
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Despite her initial defeat, Murray’s belief in Jane’s
liberatory potential in the war against discrimination did not
waiver. Murray pressed Jane into service to convince Black
women they had a “stake in the . . . movement to make the
guarantee of equal rights without regard to sex part of the
fundamental law of the land.”17 Murray also used Jane to
challenge Black women’s second-class status in movements for
racial justice18 and women’s rights.19 Murray’s Jane needed
“sex” added to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,20 because
without it the law “would benefit Negro males primarily and
thus offer genuine equality of opportunity to only one-half of the
potential Negro workforce.”21 Murray’s Jane also highlighted

17. Pauli Murray, Constitutional Law and Black Women, in REBELS IN
LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS 59 (J. Clay Smith ed. 2000)
[hereinafter Murray, Constitutional Law]; see also Murray, Quest for Equality,
supra note 4, at 172; MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 388–89 (“My discovery of
the historical links between the struggles for the abolition of slavery and the
rights of women gave me a new perspective that helped me balance the
tensions created by the double burden of race and sex.”); SERENA MAYERI,
REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 50
(2011) (“Reasoning from race allowed black feminists to invoke paradigms
already accepted by the civil rights and legal establishments and to highlight
the benefits of allying themselves with a numerous and potentially powerful
constituency—white women.”).
18. Murray, Quest for Equality, supra note 4, at 175 (criticizing the
“deliberate” omission at the March on Washington where “[n]ot a single
woman was invited to make one of the major speeches or to be part of the
delegation of leaders who sent to the White House”); see also MURRAY,
LIBERATION, supra note 4, at 189 (describing Black Power as “a bid for black
males to share power with white males in a continuing patriarchal society in
which both black and white females are relegated to secondary status”). But
see Official Program for the March on Washington (1963), NAT.’L ARCHIVES,
https://perma.cc/KEV5-P9XS (listing Mrs. Medgar Evers as delivering a
“Tribute to Negro Women Fighters for Freedom” recognizing herself, Daisy
Bates, Diane Nash Bevel, Mrs. Herbert Lee, Rosa Parks, and Gloria
Richardson).
19. See SARAH AZARANASKY, THE DREAM IS FREEDOM: PAULI MURRAY AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC FAITH 67 (2011) (describing the circumstances of
Murray’s resignation from the National Organization for Women).
20. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21. Murray, Title VII Memorandum, supra note 9, at 20–21; see also
MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 641–42 (explaining Murray’s resolve to retain
“sex” in Title VII in order to avoid excluding “so large a category as women
workers”); Murray & Eastwood, supra note 9, at 24; Murray, Liberation, supra
note 4, at 187 (identifying Black women’s “economic necessity to earn a living
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“the distance between the degraded Black female and the
exalted stereotype of her white counterpart, the Southern
lady.”22
Murray’s Janes were multiple, and their particularities
depended on where and how Murray used them. At times Jane
was found in the “parallels between race and gender.”23 At other
times, she was found at the intersection of the “‘dual burden’ [of
race and sex] in the lives of Black women.”24 In 1965, both Janes
made their courtroom debut before a three-judge federal district
court panel in Montgomery, Alabama, in a case Murray
predicted would be the “Brown v. Board of Education for women

to help support their families” as driving gender and sex relations within the
Black community, which supported adding sex to Title VII); id. at 196 (“In the
face of their multiple disadvantages, it seems clear that black women can
neither postpone nor subordinate the fight against sex discrimination to the
black revolution.”); MAYERI, supra note 17, at 22; COLLINS, supra note 10, at
234 (describing Jane Crow as capturing “how racism and sexism took
particular form in the experiences of African American women”); COOPER,
supra note 7, at 88 (characterizing Murray’s Jane Crow as “nam[ing] a
powerful system of gender disciplining within Black intellectual
communities”); Caroline Chiappetti, Winning the Battle But Losing the War:
The Birth and Death of Intersecting Notions of Race and Sex Discrimination in
White v. Crook, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 469, 481 (2017) (explaining that
Murray’s Jane Crow “describe[s] the system of overlapping discrimination she
faced as an African-American woman”); ROSALIND ROSENBERG, JANE CROW:
THE LIFE OF PAULI MURRAY 309 (2017) (observing that one version of Jane Crow
describes “the compounding effects of gender plus race discrimination for
women of color”); Roisman, supra note 7, at 11 (noting that “[a]s early as 1945,
Murray wrote that [she] was ‘beginning to believe strongly that the . . . [Fair
Employment Practices Commission] bill should be amended to include “sex”
along with its other “race, color, creed or national origin” factors.’” (quoting
PAULI MURRAY & CAROLINE WARE, FORTY YEARS OF LETTERS IN BLACK AND
WHITE 35–36 (Anne Firor Scott ed. 2006))).
22. Murray, Constitutional Law, supra note 17, at 59; see also Murray,
Quest for Equality, supra note 4, at 173.
23. ROSENBERG, supra note 21, at 309.
24. Id.
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in this country.”25 White v. Crook26 challenged the
constitutionality of using race and sex to limit juror eligibility to
white men in a county where Black women were the plurality.27
Murray and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
litigation team28 filed the case on behalf of the “male and female
25. MAYERI, supra note 17, at 29 (citation omitted); see also MURRAY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 10 (describing White as “a historic victory for
civil rights as well as women’s rights”); ROSENBERG, supra note 21, at 296
(describing Murray’s joy and optimism at the jury’s verdict in White). Although
Murray’s characterization was accurate, Alabama Attorney General
Richmond Flowers chose not to appeal the district court’s decision to the
Supreme Court. MAYERI, supra note 17, at 29. Five years later the Supreme
Court found sex discrimination to be unconstitutionally arbitrary and
unreasonable. Id. It would be another four years before the Supreme Court
struck down a state law that treated men and women differently for the
purposes of jury service. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 523, 537 (1975)
(holding that a male defendant charged with aggravated kidnapping had
standing to challenge a Louisiana law that excluded women from jury service
unless they “previously filed a written declaration of [their] desire to be subject
to jury service,” and that the law, so challenged, was unconstitutional); see also
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (“The systematic and
intentional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a racial group or an
economic or social class, deprives the jury system of the broad base it was
designed by Congress to have in our democratic society.” (citations omitted));
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (declaring the use of peremptory
challenges to strike men as potential jurors in a case brought by a mother in a
paternity and child support proceeding to be unconstitutional and, as a result,
rendering women’s sex irrelevant to the constitutional protections against sex
discrimination for which White stood); Chiappetti, supra note 21, at 469
(noting that until White v. Crook sex-based classifications did not violate equal
protection); Fred P. Graham, The Law: Rights Case Yields Dividend for
Women, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 1966), https://perma.cc/6BK2-Q7M6 (“Under the
Federal rules, the three-judge court could decide the racial issue, once the
female exclusion law brought the case before it.”). Murray and Dorothy Kenyon
are listed as co-authors on the ACLU’s brief arguing that the Idaho probate
code’s preference for male estate administrators was unconstitutionally
arbitrary. See Brief for Petitioner at 1, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No.
70-4).
26. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
27. See id. at 404
The 1960 census reflects that the total population of Lowndes County was
15,417 and that Negroes comprised 80.7% of the total county population and
72.0% of the adult male population. The white males between the ages of 21
to 65 totaled 738, and the nonwhite males between the ages of 21 to 65
totaled 1,798. The white females between the ages of 21 to 65 totaled 789,
and the nonwhite females between the ages of 21 to 65 totaled 2,278.

28. The ACLU team included Charles Morgan, head of ACLU’s Southern
Regional Office, and Dorothy Kenyon. Samantha Barbas, Dorothy Kenyon and
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Negro citizens and residents in Lowndes County, Alabama.”29
They contended Lowndes County’s exclusion of Black men and
all women from jury service violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.30
The race discrimination was caused by the failure of the
jury commissioners and the commission clerk to follow Alabama
law.31 Instead of compiling a list of potential jurors from
multiple sources, county officials relied almost exclusively on
the list of registered voters in a county where Blacks had been
prevented from registering to vote for almost a century.32 These
voter lists provided a “race-neutral” means to achieve the
racially discriminatory end of all-white juries.33 Failing to
the Making of Modern Legal Feminism, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 423, 424 (2009).
Kenyon, a former New York City municipal judge, advocated for Gwendolyn
Hoyt in her 1961 challenge to her conviction by an all-male jury for killing her
abusive husband. See generally Brief for the Florida Civil Liberties Union and
the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (No. 31). Kenyon and Murray met in 1946
in New York. MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 490.
29. White, 251 F. Supp. at 401. The five plaintiffs were Gardenia White,
Lillian McGill, Jesse Favor, Willie Mae Strickland, and John Hulett. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see also id. at 404 (noting that Alabama required jury
commissioners and commission clerks “to scan the [voter] registration lists,
the list returned to the tax assessor, any city directories and telephone
directories, and any and every other source of information, and to visit every
precinct in the county at least once a year”); id. at 403 (describing the
procedure implemented by the jury commissioner “to obtain the name of every
male citizen of the county over twenty-one and under sixty-five years of age
and their occupation, place of residence and place of business” (internal
quotations omitted)).
32. Id. at 405; see also HASAN KWAME JEFFRIES, BLOODY LOWNDES: CIVIL
RIGHTS AND BLACK POWER IN ALABAMA’S BLACK BELT 14–17 (2009) (noting that
during the Reconstruction Era, Blacks in Lowndes County elected a Black man
to represent the County in the Alabama state legislature); id. at 76–79 (stating
that Lowndes was one of 548 counties in the United States that met the Voting
Rights Act criteria for a federal registrar, and “one of . . . nine to receive them
immediately”); CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK
AWAKENING OF THE 1960S 165 (1995) (“The voter registration effort received a
boost on August 10[, 1965] . . . when a federal registrar arrived in the County
under the provisions of the recently enacted Voting Rights Act.”).
33. See White, 251 F. Supp. at 403 (finding that between 1953 and the
beginning of the White trial, “98% of the names on venires of prospective jurors
appeared on the contemporaneous voting lists”); see also MURRAY, STATES’
LAWS, supra note 9, at 21 (cataloging Alabama’s facially-neutral but racially
discriminatory voting requirements); County in Alabama Drops Voting Test
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proffer any evidence to explain how all-white juries were
possible in a majority Black county left the inference of de facto
racial discrimination unrebutted.34 Consequently, the Court
concluded the Lowndes County officials had violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.35
The sex discrimination was caused by an Alabama statute
that excluded all women from jury service.36 To succeed on this
claim, Jane would have to do something new.37 Four years
earlier, in Hoyt v. Florida,38 the Supreme Court upheld a Florida
statute that treated women and men differently for the purposes

Called Harsh, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 1965), https://perma.cc/FH3U-UMLY
(announcing the discontinuation of a literacy test requirement for prospective
new voters in Lowndes County in light of the pending lawsuit challenging its
constitutionality); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 880 (S.D. Ala. 1949)
(declaring the racially-neutral Boswell Amendment unconstitutional because
it “was intended to be . . . used for the purpose of discriminating against
applicants for the franchise on the basis of race or color”); Graham, supra note
25 (describing the residual benefits to women from the Civil Rights
Movement); John Lewis & Archie E. Allen, Black Voter Registration Efforts in
the South, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 108–09 (1972) (enumerating
disenfranchising devices including registration, literacy tests, constitutional
reading and interpretation tests, civic understanding tests, good character
tests, residential requirements, and poll taxes); MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4,
at 306–07 (stating that in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, voter lists used to
compile juror lists and poll taxes acted as a virtual bar to both the voting booth
and jury box for those unable to pay the poll tax).
34. See White, 251 F. Supp. at 405 (describing the systematic exclusion of
female and Black male citizens from jury service in Lowndes County).
35. Id. at 408.
36. In 1965, Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina banned women
from jury service. See id. at 408 n.14 (stating that South Carolina repealed its
ban in 1967 and Mississippi followed suit in 1968). But see State v. Hall, 187
So. 2d 861, 870 (Miss. 1966) (declining to follow White).
37. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (holding that a
Michigan law prohibiting a woman from obtaining a bartending license unless
she tended bar in an establishment owned by her father or husband did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding that voting was not among the
privileges and immunities of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1872) (excluding
admission to state bar and licensure to practice law from the privileges and
immunities of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Ex
parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, 117 (1894) (reaffirming Bradwell).
38. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
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of jury service.39 White could be distinguished from Hoyt because
the litigants in White asserted their rights to serve as jurors
while Gwendolyn Hoyt asserted her right to be tried and
convicted by a jury of her peers.40 This distinction allowed White
to take advantage of a doctrinal opening that, twelve years
earlier, changed the touchstone of constitutional equality from
race to arbitrariness.41 The Black women plaintiffs in White
expanded constitutional equality based on their lawyers’
arguments analogizing the sex discrimination in White to the
discrimination based on Mexican ancestry that the Supreme
Court declared arbitrary and unreasonable in Hernandez v.
Texas.42 The strategy worked, the plaintiffs prevailed, and the
39. See id. at 69 (“[T]he disproportion of women to men on the list
independently carries no constitutional significance. In the administration of
the jury lows proportional class representation is not a constitutionally
required factor.”).
40. Compare White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (“The
women plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and other women similarly situated
contend very forcefully that the Alabama statute that bars their exercise of
this basic right is unconstitutional.”), with Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 58 (“At the core
of appellant’s argument is the claim that the nature of the crime of which she
was convicted peculiarly demanded the inclusion of persons of her own sex on
the jury.”).
41. In Hernandez, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to reach non-racial discrimination that was as arbitrary as racial
discrimination. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954). The case was
brought by a criminal defendant of Mexican ancestry who challenged his
conviction by an exclusively white and Anglo jury. Id. at 477. Striking
potential jurors with Spanish surnames or Mexican ancestry violated
Hernandez’s constitutional rights. Id. at 480–81. The violation, however, was
not based on race because Texas defined those of Mexican ancestry as white.
Id. at 479. Therefore, Hernandez’s claim was intra-racial and challenged
Texas’ hierarchy of whiteness, according to which Mexican ancestry othered
some whites vis-à-vis the normative whiteness possessed by those without
Mexican ancestry. Id.; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 21, at 254 (describing
Hernandez as having helped to overcome originalist arguments regarding the
Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose). A significant difference between
Hernandez and White was that the latter involved rights of jurors and, the
former, like Hoyt, involved rights of criminal defendants. See supra note 40.
The Supreme Court would incorporate the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial
rights, including juror impartiality, into the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby
making them applicable to the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
160 (1968).
42. 347 U.S. 475 (1954); see White, 251 F. Supp. at 408. (advancing a
judicially pragmatic view of the Fourteenth Amendment that reflects “general
principles meant to govern society and the institutions of government as they
evolve through time,” which in this case supports the “conclusion . . . that the
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District Court struck down the Alabama law by violating the
Fourteenth Amendment.43
The outcome in White led Murray to credit the Black women
litigants as having “won jury service rights not only for
[themselves] but for all the women of Alabama, Black and
White.”44 But is this true? Did Gardenia White, Lillian S.
McGill, and Willie Mae Strickland, in fact, secure jury service
rights for all women in Alabama? The answers to these
questions are found in the case’s two Janes. Although the Black
women secured all women’s right not to be excluded from jury
service because of their sex, the Court’s remedy was limited to
the group of women for whom sex was their only obstacle.45 The
sex discrimination remedy alone would have had little effect on
the Black women who were excluded from both the voting booth
and the jury box because of their race and sex. Therefore, the
women whose constitutional injuries were remedied by White’s
sex discrimination claim were white. White involves two Janes
not one.
The two Janes in White reflect a truth that neither the
litigators nor the court seemed willing to face. The Jane who
personified the intersectional race and sex discrimination faced
complete exclusion of women from jury service in Alabama is arbitrary”); see
also Ala. Tchrs. Ass’n v. Lowndes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 289 F. Supp. 300, 306
(M.D. Ala. 1968) (noting that the Constitution requires legal distinctions to be
“based upon some reasonable ground—some difference which bears a just and
proper relationship to the attempted class—and not a mere arbitrary
selection” (quoting Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 560–61
(1902))); Murray & Eastwood, supra note 9, at 238 (citing Hernandez for the
proposition that “[t]he protective cover of the Fourteenth Amendment is broad
enough to reach all arbitrary class discrimination”); Smith v. King, 277 F.
Supp. 31, 38 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (holding that a “substitute father” regulation is
a race-neutral constitutionally arbitrary rule that “must always rest upon
some difference which bears a reasonable and just relationship to the act in
respect to which the classification is proposed” (citing White, 251 F. Supp. at
408–09)); cf. Fred P. Graham, Alabama Warns of Welfare Cuts: Says It May
Slash Payments if High Court Voids Purge, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 1967),
https://perma.cc/U4TS-J4JN (PDF) (describing the threatened elimination of
welfare payments if Alabama was forced to restore children to welfare rolls
when their mothers had extramarital relations).
43. White, 251 F. Supp. at 408–09.
44. Murray, Constitutional Law, supra note 17, at 57–58.
45.
See White, 251 F. Supp. at 409 (“In this case it is the women
themselves who assert their right to serve as jurors, or, more accurately, their
right not to be excluded from jury service solely because of their sex.”).
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by the Black women litigants was at odds with the single-axis
analogical Jane whose narrative proved that sex, like race, was
unconstitutionally arbitrary.46 Analogical white Jane is the
juridical actor recognized in the case’s theory and remedy. She
is “clandestinely racialized,” thereby masking the racial
specificity and normativity of her whiteness and erasing Black
Jane without whom white Jane would have not prevailed.47
For Murray, the two Janes also reflect the cognitive
dissonance caused by Murray’s aspirations and experiences. On
the one hand, Murray aspired to use Jane to tap the unrealized
potential of an interracial sisterhood committed to
constitutional sex equality. On the other hand, Murray
experienced “the dichotomy of a racially segregated society
which ha[d] become increasingly polarized” and “prevented
[Black and white] women from cementing a natural alliance.”48
Murray appears not to see this racial polarization as relevant to
the women’s sex discrimination claim in White.49 Murray, the
lawyers, and the judges involved in the case underestimated the
significance of white women’s complicity in maintaining white

46. See MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 7 (considering race and
sex discrimination as parallel and analogical and noting that the movements
to oppose both occasionally “converged”); Murray, Liberation, supra note 4, at
191 (stating that “[t]he parallels between racism and sexism have been
distinctive features of American society,” and sometimes had “interchangeable
leadership”); AZARANASKY, supra note 19, at 67 (recounting that Murray
“cowrote the ACLU brief that framed women’s rights to serve on juries
according to the standards of protection detailed in the Fourteenth
Amendment”); Chiappetti, supra note 21, at 496 (“For Murray, intersectional
and analogical arguments were intertwined; she frequently invoked her own
identity to demonstrate that without special attention to sex discrimination
one-half of black Americans would be left without protection, fatally
hampering racial progress.” (internal quotations omitted)).
47. The litigation strategy needed a statutory challenge to ensure a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court if things at trial went awry. See supra note 45
and accompanying text; Chiappetti, supra note 21, at 495 (“Though neither
discrimination in the selection of jurors on the basis of race nor on the basis of
sex ended with White v. Crook or any of the subsequent cases to reach the
Supreme Court, the constitutional language of the court was nevertheless
revolutionary.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (requiring a three-judge panel to
hear challenges to the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional
districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body).
48. Murray, Liberation, supra note 4, at 191.
49. See Murray, Black Strategies, supra note 9, at 163.
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minority rule in the majority Black and female county.50 Murray
and the others failed to hold analogical white Jane to account
for her role in keeping Jim and Black Jane unfree. The
misalignment of Black women’s bodies and universalized white
women’s evidence required Murray to “rationalize, ignore and
even deny” that the Black and white women in Alabama were
adversaries rather than allies.51
This Article focuses on the two Janes who, after White,
stood on the precipice of a jurisprudential break that “signaled
a turning point in the law.”52 On the other side of the doctrinal
chasm, their paths diverged, and only one Jane was in fact
intersectional.53 Seeing Black intersectional Jane requires
centering not only Black women, but also the Lowndes County
Black Freedom Movement, both of which are essential to White’s
intersectional potential.54
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I
uses intersectionality as developed by Patricia Hill Collins to
demonstrate how Jim and Jane Crow in Lowndes County as well
as the Black Freedom Movement are essential for White to

50. Kelly Coleman, the jury commission clerk, was a defendant in the
case. The other defendants included “the members of the jury commission . . . ;
the judge for the Second Judicial Circuit of Alabama, which includes Lowndes
County; the probate judge and the sheriff of Lowndes County; the solicitor and
the clerk of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alabama, which includes Lowndes
County; the foreman of the grand jury of Lowndes County; and the solicitor of
Lowndes County.” White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
51. FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam Markmann
trans., Pluto Press 1986) (1952).
52. MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 655. A jurisprudential break is like
an epistemological break which Greg Tate describes as “hella crunk nouveau
knowledge that interrupts, disrupts, and transforms our sense of life’s
possibilities and the kind of folk we believe to be forces for apocalyptic change
in the world too.” GREG TATE, Charles Edward Anderson Berry and the History
of Our Future, in FLYBOY 2: THE GREG TATE READER 59 (2016).
53. Chiapetti, supra note 21, at 472 (“White v. Crook failed to achieve
jurisprudential convergence and demonstrate the bifurcated history[,] and
legal literature . . . maintains this divergence.”).
54. Jeffries defines Black Freedom politics as combining “political
engagement . . . with the movement’s egalitarian organizing methods [and]
the people’s freedom rights agenda.” JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 145; see also
RANSBY, supra note 3, at 345 (“With great hopes for building an oasis of black
political empowerment in the Deep South, SNCC helped launch the Lowndes
County Freedom Organization in Alabama . . . .”).
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maintain its intersectional integrity.55 Part II uses a narrative
for the women in White that centers Black women in the Black
Freedom Movement, as well as their feminist politics and
praxis.56 This narrative is intersectional and overcomes the
cognitive dissonance caused by the way White was litigated and
the way the Black women plaintiffs experienced the convergence
of race and sex discrimination. Part III considers the
fundamental difference between reasoning though race to
achieve Black freedom and reasoning from race to achieve
equality which is understood in this case to be race neutral
rather than racially contingent.57
I.

INTERSECTIONALITY, JIM AND JANE CROW, AND THE BLACK
FREEDOM MOVEMENT

In Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory, Patricia Hill
Collins invites readers to examine “saturated sites of
intersectionality [that] constitute hypervisible sites of
intersecting power relations and have [the] feel of an important
conjuncture.”58 These sites are “important for intersectionality’s
theoretical development” in three ways.59 First, they are “a form
of conceptual glue that binds intersecting systems of power
together” and operate “as a constellation of practices” that are
“essential to organizing and managing power as domination.”60
Second, they reveal “new pathways for conceptualizing
domination” that “reframe them not as a matter of human
nature or circumstance, but as fundamental to power as
55. See infra Part I.
56. See infra Part II.
57. See infra Part III.
58. COLLINS, supra note 10, at 235. Collins explains that these “are places
where intersecting systems of oppression converge, yet they are not static.
They change as the systems to which they are attached change.” Id. Collins
“provide[s] a set of analytical tools for intersectionality’s practitioners . . . who
want to develop intersectionality’s critical analyses with an eye toward social
problem solving and social change.” Id. “Strengthening intersectionality’s
theoretical core is essential for meeting this goal.” Id. at 288; see also
AZARANSKY, supra note 19, at 73 (“[S]tandpoint theory identifies how
entanglements of class, gender, race, and imperialism, among others, produce
interstructured oppressions from which emerges different descriptions of
reality.”).
59. COLLINS, supra note 10, at 238.
60. Id.

1108

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093 (2022)

domination.”61 Third, they illuminate “resistant knowledge
projects . . . as . . . saturated sites of intersecting power
relations [and] invite[] entirely new questions concerning the
types of [oppositional] ideas and actions” at work.62
First, in 1965, Lowndes County was a “saturated” and
“hypervisible site[] of intersecting power relations” between
Blacks and whites living under Jim and Jane Crow.63
Throughout Alabama, Jim and Jane Crow produced and policed
a hierarchy of power relations and norms expressed in a complex
scheme of laws and practices that applied to women and men of
both races.64 Strict racial segregation, combined with gendered
labor market segmentation, determined which bodies were
suited for what kind of labor.65 Alabama laws also defined the
boundaries of proper intimacy to protect racial purity in the
name of morality and public safety.66 Jim and Jane were the

61. Id. at 238–39.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 235.
64. In the same year that the district court decided White, it also noted
that “forty-four sections of the Alabama Code [are] devoted to the maintenance
of segregation in schools, public utilities, mental institutions, nursing, penal
and correctional institutions, pauper care, and the marriage choice. Negroes
have been excluded from municipal recreational facilities, swimming pools,
parks, libraries and museums, and from jury service.” United States v.
Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95, 102 (M.D. Ala. 1966); see also MURRAY, STATES’
LAWS, supra note 9, at 29–32; COOPER, supra note 7, at 95 (arguing that Jim
and Jane Crow, “and the politics of respectability that arose in response,
constituted a racialized production of a gender schema”).
65. For example, Title 46, Section 189(19) of the Alabama Code prohibited
white women nurses from working “in wards or rooms in hospitals . . . in which
negro men [were] placed for treatment, or to be nursed.” MURRAY, STATES’
LAWS, supra note 9, at 31. Consequently, these hospitals were staffed
exclusively with Black women nurses. Similarly, domestic work was an
overwhelmingly Black and female occupation. STUDENT NONVIOLENT
COORDINATING COMMITTEE, THE GENERAL CONDITION OF THE ALABAMA NEGRO
18 (1965), https://perma.cc/GSN5-XMS8 (PDF). In 1960, 53% of Black women
in Alabama worked in domestic service as compared to 3% of white women. Id.
One percent were Black men and there were no white men. Id. In this way,
domestic service was a Black woman’s job. Id.; see also HANDS ON THE FREEDOM
PLOW: PERSONAL ACCOUNTS BY WOMEN IN SNCC 463 (Faith S. Holsaert, et al.
eds., 2012) [hereinafter HANDS].
66. See e.g., MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS, supra note 9, at 30–31 (stating that
Alabama classified marriage, adultery, and fornication between white persons
and negroes, as well as the issuance of licenses and performance of marriages,
as criminal offenses); id. at 31 (noting that in Alabama, prisoners in jails and
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“conceptual glue that [bound] intersecting systems of [white
supremacy, patriarchy, and class exploitation] together . . . as a
constellation of practices . . . essential to organizing and
managing [race, sex, and class] power as domination.”67 Key to
this domination in Lowndes County was the complete control
over local politics and the administration of justice by the white
minority, which required the Black majority to be
disenfranchised.
Second, focusing on the race, gender, and class dimensions
of Jim and Jane Crow in Lowndes County reveals new pathways
for conceptualizing domination as multidimensional. White’s
remedy for the sex discrimination claim was limited to the
minority of white women for whom sex was their only obstacle
to jury service.68 Black women could not serve as jurors because
of both their race and sex. Therefore, making the Black women
whole required simultaneously remedying both the race and sex
discrimination. In other words, their intersectional injury
required an intersectional remedy. This set them apart from
both Black men and white women whose rights were secured by
the resolutions of the race and sex claims, respectively. All the
parties, however, were implicated in Jim and Jane Crow, albeit
in radically different ways. In making the case for the
arbitrariness of sex, White ignored the extent to which white
women used their power and position to dominate Black people
and keep Jim and his partner Jane unfree. Unlike women’s
equality, Black freedom required white women to divest
themselves from an equality with white men who were invested
in maintaining Jim and Jane Crow.69 That white women wielded
prisons must be separated by race and sex with an exception for husbands and
wives, who could be held together).
67. COLLINS, supra note 10, at 238.
68. Id.
69. TONI MORRISON, Women, Race, and Memory, in THE SOURCE OF
SELF-REGARD: SELECTED ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND MEDITATIONS 92 (2019)
[hereinaftter MORRISON, Women, Race, and Memory]. Feminists do not
necessarily reject the male model or retain it because it is superior, but rather
assert their right to be equal to men because they, as individuals or a group,
are just as capable and entitled as those men. Murray was not rejecting
maleness as the model but was instead asserting her right to be afforded
opportunities based on her individual ability without sex as a disability. See,
e.g., Murray, Appeal to Harvard Law, supra note 14, at 79. This analysis is
reflected in the doctrine of constitutional equality that permits sex to be used
as a classification only if it is substantially related to an important
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power and oppressed Black people is the backstory of the
narrative of women’s achievement, which places them in both
the class of women on whose behalf the sex discrimination claim
was litigated, and the group of defendants opposed to Black
freedom rights.70 Seeing these differences is the type of “critical
engage[ment] with racism” that reveals “the tyranny of the
universal,” which is reflected in the sex discrimination claim on
behalf of all women.71

governmental interest and there is an “exceedingly persuasive justification”
for using sex to discriminate among otherwise equal or similar individuals.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
70. Hulda Coleman, superintendent of the county’s public schools, was an
exemplar included in the women’s narrative who used her power to oppose the
federal desegregation mandate. JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 111, 113; see also
Lowndes Schools Told to Integrate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 1966),
https://perma.cc/AN4G-M99D (PDF). Federal efforts to desegregate Lowndes
County’s public schools caused white parents to boycott the schools and to
establish a private all-white academy not subject to Brown’s desegregation
mandate. JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 114. They were aided in their efforts by
Governor George Wallace’s televised financial appeal. Id. at 113; see also
Alabama County Planning Private School for Whites, N.Y. TIMES (July 21,
1965), https://perma.cc/X4EW-ESP7 (PDF); Lowndes County High School
Opens with White Boycott, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 1966), https://perma.cc/Y5ADWXDP (PDF). See MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS, supra note 8, at 21–28. Agnes
Baggett served three terms as Alabama’s Secretary of State (1951–1955, 1963–
1967, and 1975–1979). Glen Browder, Office of the Secretary of State,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
ALA.
(May
19,
2008),
http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1541 (last updated Oct. 21,
2016). In Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965), the district court
held that Alabama’s proposed house apportionment plan was adopted for “the
sole purpose of preventing election of Negroes to house membership.” Id. at
109. As such, the racially-neutral plan violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Id. Twenty Black sharecroppers and tenant-farmers
unsuccessfully sued their white landlords, claiming their contracts had been
altered or terminated because they registered to vote. Miles v. Dickson, 40
F.R.D. 386, 388–89 (M.D. Ala. June 15, 1966). The group that sued included
Mrs. Muffin Miles and her seven children, who were forced to leave their home
by her landlord. Id.; see also Press Release, Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) News Release (Dec. 29, 1965), https://perma.cc/AL5WZXN7 (PDF); HANDS, supra note 65, at 509 (describing SNCC workers living
in a “tent city . . . with sharecropping families who had been evicted because
they registered to vote or took part in the Movement”).
71. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, The Truth Telling Project: Violence in America,
Speech Given in St. Louis, Missouri (July 27, 2015), in FREEDOM IS A CONSTANT
STRUGGLE: FERGUSON, PALESTINE, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MOVEMENT 86–
87 (2016); see also TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND
LITERARY IMAGINATION (1992) (stating that universalism masks racial
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Third, casting Jim and Jane Crow as the result of race,
gender, and class oppression also illuminates the Black
Freedom Movement as a resistant knowledge project and invites
new questions regarding oppositional ideas and actions in
Lowndes County. Black women’s freedom required eliminating
the “brand[s] . . . affixed by the law” and practices that marked
their purported inferiority.72 Black women and freedom operate
in the larger context of resisting Jim and Jane Crow, which in
Lowndes County took the form of Black freedom rather than
equality.
II.

INTERSECTIONALITY, BLACK FREEDOM, AND BLACK
FEMINIST PRAXIS

Within the Black Freedom Movement, Black women played
important roles that helped to push Black Jane’s freedom
beyond “the boundaries of standard gender conventions.”73
These women rejected the idea “[t]hat . . . gender should prevent
[them] from a role in [the Movement].”74 Their organizing
“engendered . . . equality in many spheres” and was part of a
“political process of redefining race relations in the South” by
which “the . . . women . . . [also] redefined themselves.”75
This is not meant to suggest that these women were either
blind or immune to sexism and patriarchy. The Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was part of a
movement in which Kwame Ture (né Stokely Carmichael)
famously quipped a woman’s position was prone.76 The internal
specificity and the normativity of whiteness as well as the marginalization of
Black as other).
72. White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 405 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
73. HANDS, supra note 65, at 512. According to Gloria House, an SNCC
field secretary in Lowndes County, her “ideas were respected, and [she] felt
free to take on any aspects of the projects in which [the SNCC] were involved.”
Id. For House, “neither [her] work as a field secretary nor [her] personhood
was ever diminished or disrespected by SNCC men.” Id.; see also id. at 459
(quoting Annie Lee Avery as stating “[i]n all the projects I worked in, black
women were very important” and “strong women [who] were the force in their
communities”); JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 60.
74. HANDS, supra note 65, at 521.
75. Id. at 527.
76. See Women, SNCC, and Stokely: An Email Dialog, 2013–2014, C.R.
MOVEMENT ARCHIVE, https://perma.cc/4EC9-68G8; see also Casey Hayden, In
the Attics of My Mind, in HANDS ON THE FREEDOM PLOW: PERSONAL ACCOUNTS
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debate about patriarchy, however, was part of a larger effort to
redefine the organization and its work. SNCC’s thoroughgoing
commitment to Black self-determination raised questions about
the relationship between race, gender, and Black freedom. It did
so without centering either whiteness or maleness as the
standard according to which that freedom would be assessed.
These debates informed the decision to use only Black staff in
Lowndes County for reasons that went to the very core of Black
Freedom politics.77
In the exclusively Black space of Lowndes County, “obvious
gender disparities” were confronted as principled points of

BY WOMEN IN SNCC 381, 384–85 (Faith S. Holsaert, et al. eds., 2012)
(characterizing SNCC’s culture as “where the women in SNCC were truly
revealed,” which made the organization “unique,” and describing SNCC as
“radically humanistic, placing human values above those of law and order,
insisting that values could and should be acted out to be realized”).
77. The debate about the role of whites in SNCC raised three concerns.
First, for many, authentically working for Black self-determination on the one
hand, and using white SNCC staff in Lowndes County and seeking “white
liberal support in service of elusive dreams of integration” on the other hand,
were mutually exclusive. JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 181. Gloria House
described SNCC’s position about white staff in Lowndes County as a question
of “[h]ow could we send white organizers to black sharecroppers to convince
them we could be self-determining as a race?” HANDS, supra note 65, at 512;
see also WESLEY HOGAN, MANY MINDS, ONE HEART: SNCC’S DREAM FOR A NEW
AMERICA 390 (2009) (quoting Mary King as stating that the choice to rely
exclusively on Black staff reflected “how deeply hurt and alienated” Black
Americans felt and the need for whites “to try to understand the feelings
behind Black rejection of white help” (emphasis in original)); CARSON, supra
note 32, at 199. Second, whites posed a particular danger both to themselves
and the movements with which they were associated. This was illustrated by
the trials the ACLU hoped to postpone until Blacks were seated on juries.
JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 181. Both Tom Coleman and Collie Leroy Wilkes
were tried and acquitted by all-white, all-male juries for murdering white civil
rights workers Jonathan Daniels and Viola Liuzzo in Lowndes County. Id. The
ACLU filed White to “delay the trial of Tom Coleman until a jury that included
African Americans could be impaneled.” Id.; see also PENIEL E. JOSEPH,
WAITING ‘TIL THE MIDNIGHT HOUR: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF BLACK POWER IN
AMERICA 59 (2006) (noting that the decision in Lowndes County was influenced
by “experiences in Mississippi [that] taught them that working with whites
was unnecessarily dangerous and weakened racial solidarity at the
grassroots”). Third, the nation appeared to be outraged about white racist
violence in the South only when white civil rights workers were harmed.
JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 51. J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI “worked hard to
prevent Liuzzo’s martyrdom by circulating malicious tales impugning her
character and casting doubt on her competence as a mother.” Id. at 52.
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internal struggle.78 The Black women in the Movement used
parallels between race and sex to make the case for universal
Black freedom as a matter of race, sex, and class.79 They used
these parallels and analogies to advance an intersectional
critique that identified Black women’s labor as essential to both
the cotton economy and the Movement’s economy.80 This Black
feminist critique also allowed Black women’s labor in the
Movement to evolve in ways that reflected progress in the
Movement’s internal struggles around sex and gender roles.81
These contestations seeded the ground into which the
Movement sowed Black women’s “unity with their black
brothers [that] superseded a public break over the men’s sexist
behavior.”82 They were committed to a “vision of freedom” that
rejected the idea that Black women should “be enslaved inside
[their] organization.”83 They developed a Black feminist praxis
that helped them redefine not only “who [they] were as
females”84 but also what it meant to be free.85
78. See HOGAN, supra note 77, at 289–90.
79. See id. at 232 (explaining how the community eventually “joined race,
gender, and interracial sex as issues to be worked through”).
80. See id. (“Just as black labor underlay the entire cotton economy,
women [were] the crucial factor that [kept] the movement running on a
day-to-day basis.” (internal quotations omitted)).
81. The SNCC was different from other organizations, such as the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Avery reports were not as
prevalent in SNCC based on what Ella Baker shared about her experiences in
SCLC. HANDS, supra note 65, at 521. In the SNCC, women were often assigned
“women’s” jobs such as “typing, desk work, telephone work, filing, library
work, cooking, and the ‘assistant’ kind of administrative work, but rarely the
‘executive kind.’” HOGAN, supra note 77, at 232. At some point in time, most, if
not all, SNCC women were prohibited from driving cars in Lowndes County.
HANDS, supra note 65, at 459. This, however, changed by the time Jean Wiley
reached the community. See id. at 521 (“By the time I got to the South, SNCC
women were driving cars and riding mules, organizing the plantations and
directing the field staff, writing the reports and mobilizing the Northern
campuses.”).
82. HOGAN, supra note 77, at 232.
83. HANDS, supra note 65, at 481.
84. Id. at 582.
85. See HOGAN, supra note 77, at 230 (“Outgrowths of the SNCC
experience included participation in the Black Power, women’s liberation,
community organizing, draft-resistance, and labor movements.”). The direct
connection between SNCC, Black Power/Freedom, and feminism is captured
in “an internal education paper on women in the movement” which
“attempt[ed] to bring forward the fact that sexism was comparable to racism.”
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In the mid-1960s, however, Murray saw the politics in
Lowndes County as an outgrowth of the “increasing group
consciousness and militancy among lower-income Negroes as
well as young Negro intellectuals, reflected in the
transformation of SNCC and [Congress of Racial Equality] to
all-Negro led organizations appealing primarily to Negro
masses coupled with the withdrawal of whites from the activist
phases of the civil rights struggle.”86 Only later would Murray
see Black Freedom’s efforts to make “political power responsive
to black people” as a necessary “stage in our struggle to create a
society in which people can make free choices as equals about
all aspects of their daily lives.”87 In Lowndes County, obtaining
freedom and self-determination required the Black majority to
seize political power and to use that power to extend “freedom
rights to everyone.”88
Black Jane’s freedom requires Jim Crow, patriarchy, and
class exploitation to be eliminated, regardless of the sex of the
perpetrators. Murray, the ACLU, the Department of Justice,

Id. at 232 (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 234 (“As Bernice Reagon
observed in the 1970s, SNCC gave birth to all of these movements—Black
Power, [Economic Research and Action Projects], women’s liberation, and the
draft resistance movement.”).
86. MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 53; U.S. Aids Negroes
Fighting Jury Bar, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 1965), https://perma.cc/2KXV-WDCK
(PDF); Paul L. Montgomery, Woman Is Shot to Death on Lowndes County
Road, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 1965), https://perma.cc/WH8M-KTQA; HOGAN,
supra note 77, at 240 (“[T]he federal government’s inaction in the face of local
abuses between 1960 and 1965 dramatized its deep complicity in Jim Crow.”);
see generally Brief for the United States in Support of Intervenor’s Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D.
Ala. 1966) (No. 2663-N) [hereinafter U.S. Brief in Support of Intervenor],
https://perma.cc/TP9E-LZBU (PDF).
87. MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 58
Black Power means that in Lowndes County, Alabama (80 percent
Negro) . . . if a Negro is elected tax assessor, he will be able to tax equitably
and channel funds for the building of better roads and schools serving
Negroes. If elected sheriff, he can end police brutality . . . . On the state and
national level, it means that black people can say to white authorities, “We
need X million dollars to fix our roads and we have X million votes behind
us.”

The Black Freedom Movement reflected an “evolving black consciousness,”
which Black “[w]omen . . . were among the first to promote [as] a needed first
step in organizing.” HANDS, supra note 65, at 512, 529.
88. JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 179.
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and the district court, however, failed to hold white Jane to
account for her role in keeping Black Jane unfree. Instead, they
“reasoned from race” to secure rights for white women who they
contended had the potential to transform southern juries and
justice in Alabama.89 This view of the potential of white women
to change the nature of justice delivered by southern juries
centered white women as the key to Black freedom.90 It not only
ignored white women’s role in maintaining Jim and Jane Crow,
but also minimized the importance of a self-determining Black
majority.91 There was nothing to suggest that the 789 white
women between the ages of 21 and 65 would be more impactful
than the 4,076 Black people White required be added to the jury

89. See Robert Coles, M.D., Dep. at 35, ACLU Archives, Box 1832, Folder:
White G. v. Jury Commission, 1869, F. 2 (Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton
University) (noting that Coles based his assessment of white women’s
potential on the idea that white women and Blacks had suffered under similar
discrimination, leaving them with “a very strong role of sympathy toward the
Negro” and that white women who were “very active church women in
protesting lynching” were also sympathetic); ACLU News Release, Mar. 4,
1966, ACLU Archives, Box 1869, F.2 (Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton
University) (“Mississippi and Alabama, both of which exclude women from
juries by statute, are the two states in which the grossest miscarriages of
justice in civil rights murders have occurred.”). At the time, the ACLU
commented that, “[a]lthough White v. Crook is a historic victory for women’s
rights in the United States, its deeper significance is that it will have a
salutary effect upon the administration of justice generally in the South.” Id.
The Department of Justice, however, was a bit more circumspect, noting that,
“although we think it is clearly arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional for
Alabama to presently exclude women from juries, we do not think that the
exclusion necessarily results or has resulted in unfair trials for criminal
defendants.” U.S. Brief in Support of Intervenor, supra note 86, at 35–36. But
see ACLU News Release, Mar. 4, 1966, ACLU Archives (Mudd Manuscript
Library, Princeton University) (“An official of the Department of
Justice . . . observed that where women have served on southern juries in civil
rights cases, the chances for impartial verdicts have been increased.”).
90. See, e.g., MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 10
It is not surprising that [Alabama and Mississippi] have been the scenes of
the most violent suppression of constitutional rights in recent years and the
accused slayers of Negroes and [white] civil rights workers have frequently
escaped punishment through acquittals or refusals to indict by all-white,
all-male juries from which the overwhelming majority of the adult
population of jury age has been excluded.

91. See U.S. Asks Judges to Void Ban on Women Jurors in Alabama, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 1965), https://perma.cc/33QE-KPWK (PDF). White was one of
six jury exclusion cases filed by the ACLU in Alabama and Mississippi. U.S.
Aids Negroes Fighting Jury Bar, supra note 86.
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list.92 Moreover, eliminating both the de facto racial
discrimination and the de jure sex discrimination meant the
majority of new names added to the jury list belonged to the
2,278 Black women who, after White, were eligible to serve as
jurors.93
III. INTERSECTIONAL JANE REASONS THROUGH RACE TO BLACK
FREEDOM, ANALOGICAL JANE REASONS FROM RACE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY
In White, Murray’s clandestinely racialized analogical Jane
Crow “reasoned from race” to make the case that sex
discrimination was as arbitrary as race discrimination and both
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.94 Jane’s logic was found in
the parallels between race and sex discrimination which used
the movement to end Jim Crow as “the yardstick against which
all other reform movements [were] measured.”95 To prevail in
White, race and sex had to be sufficiently similar to warrant
equal treatment. This was the “analogical reasoning [that]
92. White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 404 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
93. See id. at 407, 409.
94. See MAYERI, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that Murray was responsible
for making “race-sex analogies the legal currency of feminism”); id. at 3
(stating that Jane Crow was Murray’s shorthand for all “laws and practices
that segregated or discriminated against women”); COOPER, supra note 7, at
101 (“The use of the race-sex analogy become one of Murray’s most signal
contributions to legal thought and civil rights activism.”); COLLINS, supra note
10, at 201 (identifying “analogical reasoning as a convention of philosophy and
Western social theory”).
95. MAYERI, supra note 17, at 2; see, e.g., Murray, Liberation, supra note
4, at 191; Pauli Murray, Roots of the Racial Crisis: Prologue to Policy (1965)
(S.J.D. dissertation, Yale University) (Schlesinger Library, Harvard Radcliffe
Institute) [hereinafter Murray, Roots] (discussing how Gunnar Myrdal and
Ashley Montague analyze the parallels between white supremacy and
patriarchy); Murray & Eastwood, supra note 9, at 234–35 (discussing Simone
de Beauvoir, Myrdal, and Montague as among the “[c]ontemporary scholars”
who explored “the interrelation of [race and sex discrimination] in the United
States”); MURRAY, SONG, supra note 4, at 362 (crediting Caroline Ware for
encouraging Murray to “develop a broader perspective on [her] minority status
and to see parallels between racism and sexism”); see also PAULI MURRAY &
CAROLINE WARE, FORTY YEARS OF LETTERS IN BLACK AND WHITE (Anne Firor
Scott ed. 2006); ROSENBERG, supra note 21, at 150–52; COLLINS, supra note 10,
at 281 (identifying “[de Beauvoir]’s conception of existential freedom as a form
of resistance to women’s oppression” as an example of “[w]omen . . . invok[ing]
the emancipatory language of freedom”).
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justified applying accepted principles [regarding Jim Crow] to
new circumstances” faced by Jane Crow.”96
By contrast, an intersectional analysis reasons through, not
from, race. It does so by centering Black Jane’s “dual
handicap . . . of race and sex.”97 It treats Black women as full
juridical subjects whose constitutional injuries are remedied as
matters of freedom not equality. Being unfree in Lowndes
County included being barred from jury boxes and voting booths,
both of which were important indicia of self-determination for
the county’s Black majority. Black women and men worked
together “to transform southern politics”98 by creating a “new,

96. MAYERI, supra note 17, at 2; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 21, at
150–51 (“Murray believed that the approach she advocated for killing Jim
Crow . . . could work for killing Jane Crow [because the latter was] a form of
bias that mimicked [the former] and was best attacked using the same legal
theories.”); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (“[T]hroughout much
of the 19th Century the position of women in our society was, in many respects
comparable to that of Blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither
slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own
names.” (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973))).
97. Murray, Constitutional Law, supra note 17, at 58; see also Murray &
Eastwood, supra note 9, at 242–56. Murray was a speaker at the National
Council of Negro Women’s 1963 Convention, “The Negro Woman in the
Emancipation Century.” National Council of Negro Women/National Archives
for Black Women’s History, Subgroup 1, Series 2, Box 16, F. 169 (on file with
the National Park Service). The Convention call described Black women as
having “lived in a cultural milieu of racial discrimination and fought for rights
denied her first as a woman, then a Negro.” Id.; see also Murray, Constitutional
Law, supra note 17, at 58; Murray, Quest for Equality, supra note 4, at 173
(describing Black women as having “to fight against the stereotypes of ‘female
dominance’ on the one hand and loose morals on the other hand, both growing
out of the roles forced upon them during the slavery experience and its
aftermath”); Murray, Roots, supra note 95, at 30 (recognizing that “the great
majority of Negro Americans—the poor, the unemployed, the uprooted, and
the dispossessed” demonstrated the need to “go beyond legal guarantees and
attack the behavioral consequences of protracted deprivation”); ROSENBERG,
supra note 21, at 270–73 (describing “loose morals” as a problem for Black
people and how prevailing “stereotypes grew out of leadership roles forced on
black women by slavery and sustained through Jim Crow”).
98. HANDS, supra note 65, at 509; see also JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 3.
Two of the main places in which Black protests took root were Calhoun and
White Hall, where the county’s Black landowners were located and enjoyed
“the greater economic independence that owning land conferred on black
farmers.” Id.; see also CARSON, supra note 32, at 164 (noting that Black
property owners were the core of “a group of militant and self-reliant local
black residents who sustained the movement in Lowndes County”).
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more democratic political culture rooted in freedom politics.”99
Black jurors could change the way justice was delivered by the
county’s courts. Registered Black voters, however, could change
things like “running water, paved roads, better schools, and a
law-abiding sheriff” only if they could vote for candidates who
shared their vision of freedom.100 An Alabama law permitting
independent political parties to field candidates in municipal
and county elections led to the founding of the Lowndes County
Black Panther Party (the Party).101 The Party “transformed
local protest by providing African-Americans with a formal
social movement organization through which they could
mobilize a sizeable segment of the black population in a
sustained, organized, public effort to secure freedom rights.”102
This movement was not about the right “to sit beside a white
person in a classroom or at a lunch counter.”103 Rather, its
members adopted “a freedom rights platform, selected
candidates from the poor and working class, and practiced
democratic decision making.”104
99. JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 157.
100. Id. at 66–67; see, e.g., Walter Goodman, The Case of Mrs. Sylvester
Smith; A Victory for 400,000 Children, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1968),
https://perma.cc/742A-4JGF (PDF).
101. See JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 179–81.
102. JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 47; see HANDS, supra note 65, at 522
(describing “sharecroppers, tenant farmers and domestics” as “the people
closest to all the venom and violence of the white South”); CARSON, supra note
25, at 162 (“[T]he black residents of Lowndes County were typically poor,
landless, and economically dependent upon a small elite of white plantation
owners.”); HANDS, supra note 65, at 501 (“The whole point . . . of joining with
Southern sharecroppers and domestic workers in such a dangerous battle was
to make radical social change, to build those ‘vehicles of power’ Miss Baker
talked about and help them coalesce into a mass movement in the Deep
South.”).
103. HANDS, supra note 70, at 519.
104. JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 145. At the Lowndes County Freedom
Organization’s (LCFO) inaugural convention in 1965, the delegates chose a
slate of seven Black candidates for “sheriff, tax assessor, tax collector, coroner,
and three seats on the school board.” JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 151. Six of
the seven candidates were women: Alice Moore, Josephine Waginer, Bernice
Kelly, Virginia White, Willie Mae Strickland, and Annie Bell Scott. Id. Alice
Moore stated her platform was “tax the rich to feed the poor.” Id. at 179; see
also id. at 143–78. The LCFO’s intensive voter education effort featured
“workshops, mass meetings, and primers to increase general knowledge of
local government and democratize political behavior.” JEFFRIES, supra note 32,
at 145; see also JOSEPH, supra note 77, at 128–29.
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Moreover, constitutional equality cloaks the race and sex
normativity of white men as full persons and citizens.105 In
White, analogical Jane’s equality accepts the legitimacy of the
white male norm and seeks to share power equally with white
men in circumstances where it would be arbitrary and

105. Collins contends that “the construct of nation gains meaning from
related constructs of ethnicity and race.” COLLINS, supra note 10, at 263
(emphasis added). Consequently, “[b]ecoming American meant becoming
white.” Id. In Lowndes County and elsewhere in Alabama, this meant Jim
Crow was used both to situate individuals and groups within the racialized
and gendered hierarchy of citizenship and personhood, as well as to justify
their placement within that hierarchy. The fight for Black Freedom directly
challenged the legitimacy of the hierarchy, as well as the entire concept of
racially exclusive citizenship and claims regarding belonging. Imani Perry
observes that “[t]he West [has] effectively constructed nation-states and
citizenship in terms that define ‘the patriarch as citizen.’” IMANI PERRY, VEXY
THING: ON GENDER AND LIBERATION 87 (2018). Perry continues, “Patriarchy is
made of personhood, sovereignty, and property. This entails laws and
citizenship and nation-states.” Id. at 175. Toni Morrison makes a similar
observation about “how whiteness matures and ascends the throne of
universalism by maintaining its power to describe and to enforce its
descriptions.” TONI MORRISON, The Trouble with Paradise, in THE SOURCE OF
SELF-REGARD: SELECTED ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND MEDITATIONS 273 (2019). The
universality of whiteness and maleness work in tandem to undermine efforts
to secure women’s liberation because this version of liberation uncritically
adopts a calculus in which “the concept of masculinity . . . connotes adventure,
integrity, intellect, freedom, and, most of all, power.” MORRISON, Women, Race,
and Memory, supra note 69, at 92. The tension between women’s freedom and
male supremacy raises, for Morrison, “the burning question of twentiethcentury feminism: How can a woman be viewed and respected as a human
being without becoming a male-like or male-dominated citizen?” Id. at 86.
Framed in this way, any effort by those who are not white cisgender male
patriarchs to assert rights or status related to personhood and citizenship as
a matter of U.S. law is Sisyphean. But see MARTHA JONES, BIRTHRIGHT
CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2018)
(positing that Black people in antebellum America asserted their citizenship
rights as matter of birthright which would eventually be constitutionalized in
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment); JOHN MERCER LANGSTON, Equality
Before the Law: The Treatment of the American Man of Color Before and Since
the Adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, in FREEDOM AND CITIZENSHIP:
SELECTED LECTURES AND ADDRESSES OF HON. JOHN MERCER LANGSTON, L.L.;
U.S. MINISTER RESIDENT AT HAITI 141–61 (1969) (“The law has . . . forever
determined, and to our advantage, that nativity, without any regard to
nationality or complexion, settles, absolutely, the question of citizenship
[which is contrary to the belief that] our color, race, and degradation, all or
either, rendered the colored American incapable of becoming a citizen of the
United States.”).
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unreasonable not to do so.106 Centering Black Jane’s identity,
community, and freedom “enlarge[s] and expand[s] and
complicate[s] and deepen[s] . . . theories and practices of
freedom.”107 This centering reveals White’s contradictions,
forcing us to “separate those things we assume go together and
to combine those things we assume are separate.”108 To do this
effectively, we must “develop understandings of social relations,
whose connections are often initially only intuited.”109 Black
Jane encourages us to develop the vision needed to “trouble the
norm rather than normalize it . . . [,] seeking to expand our
understanding of” Black freedom, sex equality, and the
Constitution.110
In White, Black Jane represents the women in the Black
Freedom Movement who adopted one of the “early models of
‘womanist’ practice[].”111 Originating at the intersection of race
and sex, Black Jane’s path reasoned through race to freedom for
all Black people. Her freedom was not defined in terms of either
white women’s subjugation or Black men’s valorization as the
quintessential holders of Black Freedom rights. Rather, her
106. See White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 409 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (“The time
must come when a state’s complete exclusion of women from jury service is
recognized as so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be unconstitutional.”).
107. DAVIS, supra note 71, at 104.
108. Id. at 105.
109. Id. at 142.
110. Id. at 104; see also JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND
THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (Routledge, 2d. ed. 1999).
111. HOGAN, supra note 77, at 241. Among the theorists was Frances
Beale, whom Gwen Patton credits with “provid[ing] the most profound insights
and analyses of our triple jeopardy—gender, race, and class status.” HANDS,
supra note 70, at 583–84; see also JOSEPH, supra note 77, at 271 (stating that
Frances Beale was the founder of SNCC’s Black Women’s Liberation
Committee (BWLC), and that by 1970 BWLC changed its name to Third World
Women’s Alliance (TWWA)); AZARANSKY, supra note 46, at 85 (arguing that
Murray’s critique of the masculinist bent of Black Power was shared by
Frances Beale and the TWWA, who “crafted a multi-positioned political space
through which they fashioned feminist politics that also theorized and enacted
central ideological commitments of the Black Power Movement as part of their
feminist politics”); Chiappetti, supra note 21, at 477 (“[I]t was the sex
discrimination operating within the civil rights movement of [this period] that
ultimately radicalized black women.” (emphasis in original)); ROSENBERG,
supra note 21, at 331. See generally Frances Beale, Double Jeopardy: To Be
Black and Female, in WORDS OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN
FEMINIST THOUGHT 146–55 (Beverly Guy-Sheftall ed. 1995).
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freedom required undoing the lingering badges and incidents of
slavery at the root of Jim and Jane Crow laws and practices. To
achieve this end, she simultaneously challenged both white
supremacy and patriarchy.112
By contrast, white Jane represents the white women in
Lowndes County who were committed to the idea that power,
suffrage, and jury service should be exclusively white.113 The
analogical reasoning and the language of equality used in White
allowed white Jane to be liberated on the back of Black Jane,
whose continued subjugation under Jim Crow is indispensable
to the equality white Jane seeks.114 Although both Janes are
involved in a constitutional makeover, they enter the doctrinal
space from two very different starting points. White Jane
emerged from the interstices between sex and race as advanced
112.

See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 US 409, 441–43 (1968)

[T]his Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have
encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery—its “burdens and
disabilities”—included restraints upon “those fundamental rights which are
the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right . . . to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. Just as the
Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free exercise of those
rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes
from white communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when
racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.
(quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)).

113. See MORRISON, Women, Race, and Memory, supra note 69, at 92
(“[M]asculinity is very much the measure of adulthood (personhood).”).
Equality between the sexes proceeds not based on the assumption that the
male norm is inferior but rather with “the tacit agreement that masculinity is
preferable” and “a tacit acceptance of male supremacy.” Id. at 93; see generally
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). Therefore, women can be irrelevant to
sex claims in the same way Black women are largely irrelevant to White’s sex
claim.
114. See JEFFRIES, supra note 32, at 36 (crediting white women as doubling
attendance at the second Lowndes County White Citizens Council meeting in
1956 because they “convinced their husbands, fathers, and brothers to allow
them to join”); see also id. at 84 (“[W]hite activists . . . were race
traitors . . . and they, like Viola Liuzzo, deserved their fate. ‘If they’d been
tending to their own business like I tend to mine, they’d be living today and
enjoying themselves today . . . .’”); Roy Reed, White Supremacist Jurors
Approved in Liuzzo Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1965), https://perma.cc/RKN2EGV2 (PDF) (documenting Attorney General Richmond Flowers’ unsuccessful
attempt “to purge racists from the jury” after “he spent two and a half days
documenting their prejudice”).
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in parallel in White. This analysis all but ignored the race
discrimination that not only made the case necessary but also
demonstrated the arbitrariness of sex. Plaintiffs and defendants
alike operated according to the racialized and gendered
hierarchy in which relationships between Black and white
women were experienced rather than theorized.115 Although the
theory assumed that sex unified Black and white women, the
experiences made it probable that the constitutional rights
White guaranteed for white women, as well as the power they
would gain, would most certainly be used to continue to keep
Black women and men unfree.116
CONCLUSION
Recognizing Pauli Murray as an intersectional ancestor
requires abandoning the idea that all Janes are equal. This was
the case in White where the desire to establish women’s
constitutional equality meant that the racial differences
between the two Janes had to be minimized, if not ignored. A
close reading of White, however, reveals that the paradox of
Murray’s Janes is that intersectional Black Jane makes white
Jane’s sex equality possible based on white Jane’s record of
keeping Black Jane unfree. Black Jane maintains her
intersectionality only by reasoning through race to freedom for
all Black people. Her freedom requires neither white Jane’s
subjugation nor equality among the Janes based on theoretical
parallels between race and sex. Black Jane’s freedom as part of
a self-determining community free from discrimination based on
race, sex, and class was an essential part of the vision of Black
Freedom embraced by the Black women and men in Lowndes
115. Chiapetti claims civil rights activists and feminists “collaborated” and
that through White they closed the “distance between the civil rights
movement and the women’s movement, as well as the careers of the lawyers
who brought them together for a brief moment in time, notably Pauli Murray.”
Chiapetti, supra note 21, at 469. This collaboration was limited to women
outside of Lowndes County and failed to account for the absence of a civil rights
campaign in Lowndes. Id. at 470.
116. Statement by Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Before
Subcommittee No. 5, House Judiciary Committee in Support of the Proposed
“Civil Rights Act of 1966” (H.R. 14765): Hearing on H.R. 14765 before the
Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2 (1966)
(statement of Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, accompanied by
Stephen Pollack, First Assistant, Civil Rights Division, and Alan Marer).
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County. Without these freedom fighters, White and the women’s
equality it mandated would not have been possible.

